Flask SDK

Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) for Flask using SAPL (Streaming Attribute Policy Language). Provides decorator-driven policy enforcement with a constraint handler architecture for obligations, advice, and response transformation.

The sapl-flask library integrates SAPL policy enforcement into Flask applications as a Flask extension. Flask is WSGI and always synchronous, so the one-shot enforcement decorators run on the blocking enforcement core, which executes the view and its PDP communication off the event loop. The library also supports streaming responses with Server-Sent Events for continuous authorization.

What is SAPL?

SAPL is a policy language and Policy Decision Point (PDP) for attribute-based access control. Policies are written in a dedicated language and evaluated by the PDP, which streams authorization decisions based on subject, action, resource, and environment attributes.

Three core concepts:

1. Authorization subscription: your app sends { subject, action, resource, environment } to the PDP.
2. PDP decision: the PDP evaluates policies and returns PERMIT or DENY, optionally with obligations, advice, or a replacement resource.
3. Constraint handlers: registered handlers execute the policy’s instructions (log, filter, transform, cap values, etc.).

A PDP decision looks like this:

{
  "decision": "PERMIT",
  "obligations": [{ "type": "logAccess", "message": "Patient record accessed" }],
  "advice": [{ "type": "notifyAdmin" }]
}

decision is always present (PERMIT, DENY, SUSPEND, INDETERMINATE, or NOT_APPLICABLE). The other fields are optional. obligations and advice are arrays of arbitrary JSON objects (by convention with a type field for handler dispatch), and resource (when present) replaces the view’s return value entirely.

For a deeper introduction to SAPL’s subscription model and policy language, see the SAPL documentation.

Installation

Install the library and the base dependency:

pip install sapl-flask

This also installs sapl-base, which provides the PDP client, constraint engine, and content filtering. The library requires Python 3.12 or later and Flask 3.0+.

A complete working demo with constraint handlers and streaming enforcement is available at sapl-python-demos/flask_demo.

Setup

Flask Extension

Initialize the SaplFlask extension with your Flask application. Configuration is read from app.config:

from flask import Flask
from sapl_flask import SaplFlask

app = Flask(__name__)
app.config["SAPL_BASE_URL"] = "https://localhost:8443"
app.config["SAPL_TOKEN"] = "sapl_your_api_key_here"

sapl = SaplFlask(app)

For basic authentication instead of an API key:

app.config["SAPL_BASE_URL"] = "https://localhost:8443"
app.config["SAPL_USERNAME"] = "myPdpClient"
app.config["SAPL_SECRET"] = "myPassword"

sapl = SaplFlask(app)

SAPL_TOKEN (API key) and SAPL_USERNAME/SAPL_SECRET (Basic Auth) are mutually exclusive. Configure one or the other.

Application Factory Pattern

For applications using the factory pattern, use init_app:

from sapl_flask import SaplFlask

sapl = SaplFlask()


def create_app():
    app = Flask(__name__)
    app.config["SAPL_BASE_URL"] = "https://localhost:8443"
    app.config["SAPL_TOKEN"] = "sapl_your_api_key_here"

    sapl.init_app(app)
    return app

Local Development (HTTP)

For local development without TLS, point SAPL_BASE_URL at a loopback host. A plain http:// URL is accepted only when the host is localhost, 127.0.0.1, or ::1. Any plain-HTTP URL targeting a remote host is refused at construction time, so plaintext authorization decisions never leave the machine.

app.config["SAPL_BASE_URL"] = "http://localhost:8443"

sapl = SaplFlask(app)

Cleanup

Register the extension’s close() method with atexit to release PDP connections on shutdown:

import atexit

sapl = SaplFlask(app)
atexit.register(sapl.close)

The extension registers itself as app.extensions["sapl"] and is automatically discoverable by the enforcement decorators within any Flask application context.

Enforcement Decorators

All decorators work on synchronous Flask view functions. Because Flask is always synchronous, the one-shot decorators (@pre_enforce, @post_enforce) always run on the blocking enforcement core, which executes the view off the event loop, so synchronous database and IO access works normally. When you configure a transaction provider (see Database Transactions) it must be a sync context-manager factory, since the blocking core uses it as a sync context manager. The Flask request context is accessed via flask.request and flask.g, so no explicit request parameter is needed in decorator arguments.

@pre_enforce

Authorizes before the view executes. The view only runs on PERMIT.

from flask import Flask, jsonify
from sapl_flask import SaplFlask, pre_enforce

app = Flask(__name__)
sapl = SaplFlask(app)


@app.route("/patient/<patient_id>")
@pre_enforce(action="readPatient", resource="patient")
def get_patient(patient_id: str):
    return jsonify({"id": patient_id, "name": "Jane Doe", "ssn": "123-45-6789"})

Use @pre_enforce for views with side effects (database writes, emails) that should not execute when access is denied. On denial, Flask’s abort(403) is called.

@post_enforce

Authorizes after the view executes. The view always runs; its return value is available to the subscription builder via the return_value parameter.

from sapl_flask import post_enforce


@app.route("/record/<record_id>")
@post_enforce(
    action="read",
    resource=lambda: {"type": "record", "path": request.path},
)
def get_record(record_id: str):
    return jsonify({"id": record_id, "value": "sensitive-data"})

Use @post_enforce when the policy needs to see the actual return value to make its authorization decision (e.g., deny based on the data’s classification). On denial, the return value is discarded and abort(403) is called.

Building the Authorization Subscription

Each decorator accepts keyword arguments to customize the authorization subscription fields: subject, action, resource, environment, and secrets.

Default Values

When not explicitly provided, the subscription fields are derived from the Flask request context:

Field	Default
subject	g.user, or flask_login.current_user, or "anonymous"
action	{"method": request.method, "endpoint": function_name}
resource	{"path": request.path, "view_args": request.view_args}
environment	{"ip": request.remote_addr} (when available)
secrets	Not sent unless explicitly specified

Flask-Login integration is automatic: if flask-login is installed and a user is authenticated, current_user.username (or str(current_user)) is used as the subject.

Static Values

Pass a string or dict directly:

@pre_enforce(action="read", resource="patient")

Dynamic Values (Callables)

Pass a callable that receives a SubscriptionContext and returns the field value. The context provides request, return_value (None for @pre_enforce), params (view args), query (query string), and args (resolved function arguments):

@pre_enforce(
    subject=lambda ctx: getattr(ctx.request, "user", "anonymous") if ctx.request else "anonymous",
    resource=lambda ctx: {"path": ctx.params, "method": ctx.request.method} if ctx.request else {},
)

The SubscriptionContext is the same across all Python SAPL integrations, making subscription field callables portable between frameworks.

Secrets

The secrets field carries sensitive data (tokens, API keys) that the PDP needs for policy evaluation but that must not appear in logs. It is excluded from debug logging automatically. Use it when a policy needs to inspect credentials, for example passing a raw JWT so the PDP can read its claims:

@pre_enforce(
    action="exportData",
    resource=lambda ctx: {"pilotId": ctx.params.get("pilot_id")},
    secrets=lambda ctx: {"jwt": g.token} if hasattr(g, "token") else None,
)

@stream_enforce

Streaming enforcement applies an authorization decision continuously to a stream of items your view produces. The decorated view returns an async iterator of data items; SAPL opens a streaming PDP subscription and applies each decision to the stream as it runs: PERMIT passes items through, SUSPEND pauses, DENY ends it. The enforced result is itself an async iterator of authorised items, so it is independent of how you deliver them.

@stream_enforce is the ready-made binding for Server-Sent Events: it wraps the enforced iterator in a Flask Response that renders each item as an SSE data: frame on text/event-stream. SSE is the delivery shown here. For another delivery mode (a WebSocket, a gRPC stream, or consuming the stream in-process) drive the enforcement directly with run_pipeline from sapl_base.pep.streaming: it takes your async iterator and returns the enforced async iterator, with no transport assumptions.

import asyncio
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from sapl_flask import stream_enforce


@app.route("/stream/heartbeat")
@stream_enforce(action="stream:heartbeat", resource="heartbeat")
async def heartbeat():
    seq = 0
    while True:
        yield {"seq": seq, "ts": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()}
        seq += 1
        await asyncio.sleep(2)

A single decorator now covers every streaming case. The behaviour is driven by the policy verbs and by two boolean flags, both defaulting to False.

@stream_enforce(
    action="stream:heartbeat",
    resource="heartbeat",
    signal_transitions=False,       # default
    pause_rap_during_suspend=False,  # default
)

Verb routing. Every decision the PDP emits during the lifetime of the subscription maps to one observable effect.

PDP decision	Effect on the stream
PERMIT	Items flow through to the consumer.
SUSPEND	Items are silently dropped. The subscription stays open. A later PERMIT resumes the flow.
DENY	The stream terminates. The SSE binding emits a final ACCESS_DENIED frame before closing.
INDETERMINATE	The subscription terminates, the same way DENY does.
NOT_APPLICABLE	The subscription terminates, the same way DENY does.

Under the strict fail-closed discipline only an explicit SUSPEND keeps the subscription alive while pausing it. DENY, INDETERMINATE, and NOT_APPLICABLE all terminate. For keep-alive semantics where access pauses and later resumes, the policy must emit SUSPEND rather than DENY. Operators who want NOT_APPLICABLE to pause rather than terminate set the combining algorithm’s defaultDecision to SUSPEND at the PDP level.

signal_transitions. With the default False, suspend and resume boundaries are silent. The consumer sees items while permitted and a gap while suspended, with no boundary item. With True, the enforced stream carries an ACCESS_SUSPENDED boundary item each time it is suspended and an ACCESS_GRANTED boundary item each time it resumes (the SSE binding renders these as frames). Use this when the consumer should show a paused/resumed status.

pause_rap_during_suspend. With the default False, the protected async iterator stays subscribed during suspension. Items keep arriving from upstream and are dropped on the way to the client, giving lower latency on resume. With True, the upstream iterator is cancelled on entry to the suspended state and re-subscribed on resume. Use this for upstream sources with expensive side effects that must not run while access is paused.

Scenario	Configuration
Access loss is permanent (revoked credentials)	policy emits deny; defaults
Client does not need to know about gaps	policy emits suspend; defaults
Client should show suspended/restored status	policy emits suspend; signal_transitions=True

How Enforcement Works

The decorators above are convenient, but to use them well it helps to understand what actually happens behind the scenes. This section walks through the enforcement lifecycle so you can reason about behavior.

The Deny Invariant

Only PERMIT grants access. The PDP can return five possible decisions (PERMIT, DENY, SUSPEND, INDETERMINATE, NOT_APPLICABLE), and only PERMIT ever results in your view running or your stream forwarding data. Everything else means denial. The streaming PEP honours SUSPEND by pausing the stream while keeping the subscription alive, so a later PERMIT resumes it. One-shot enforcement (@pre_enforce, @post_enforce) treats SUSPEND as a denial. See Authorization Decisions for details.

A PERMIT with obligations is not a free pass. The PEP checks that every obligation in the decision has a registered handler. If even one obligation cannot be fulfilled, the PEP treats the decision as a denial. If a handler accepts responsibility but fails during execution, that also results in denial. Advice is softer: if an advice handler fails, the PEP logs the failure and moves on. Advice never causes denial.

Aspect	Obligation	Advice
All handled?	Required. Unhandled obligations deny access (403).	Optional. Unhandled advice is silently ignored.
Handler failure	Denies access (403).	Logs a warning and continues.

This means you can always trust that if your view runs, every obligation attached to the decision has been successfully enforced.

Enforcement Locations

Depending on the decorator, constraint handlers can intervene at different points in the lifecycle of a request or stream.

For request-response views (@pre_enforce and @post_enforce), constraints can run at four points:

Location	When it happens	What constraints do here
On decision	Authorization decision arrives	Side effects like logging, audit, or notification
Pre-method invocation	Before the protected view executes	Modify view arguments (@pre_enforce only)
On return value	After the view returns	Transform, filter, or replace the result
On error	If the view throws	Transform or observe the error

For streaming views (@stream_enforce), constraints can run at five points:

Location	When it happens	What constraints do here
On decision	Each new decision from the PDP stream	Side effects like logging, audit
On each data item	Each element yielded by the async iterator	Transform, filter, or replace items
On stream error	The iterator produces an error	Transform or observe the error
On stream complete	The iterator finishes normally	Cleanup and finalization
On cancel	Client disconnects or enforcement terminates	Release resources and close connections

SAPL models each of these points as a named signal, and a handler attaches to whichever signal fits the work it does. A handler that fires once when the decision arrives attaches to the decision signal. A handler that processes each emitted item attaches to the output signal. The signal a handler attaches to determines when it runs. The same ConstraintHandlerProvider mechanism is used for one-shot and streaming enforcement alike.

PreEnforce Lifecycle

When you decorate a view with @pre_enforce, here is what happens step by step.

First, the PEP builds an authorization subscription from the decorator options (or from defaults if you left them out) and sends it to the PDP as a one-shot request. The PDP evaluates the subscription against all matching policies and returns a single decision.

If the decision is anything other than PERMIT, the PEP calls abort(403) immediately. Your view never runs.

If the decision is PERMIT, the PEP resolves all constraint handlers. It walks through the obligations and advice attached to the decision and checks which registered handlers claim responsibility for each one. If any obligation has no matching handler, the PEP denies access right there, because it cannot guarantee the obligation will be enforced.

With all handlers resolved, execution proceeds through the enforcement locations in order. On-decision handlers run first (logging, audit). Then method-invocation handlers run, which can modify view arguments if the policy requires it. Then your actual view executes. After the view returns, the PEP applies return-value handlers: resource replacement if the decision included one, filter predicates, mapping handlers, and consumer handlers. If any obligation handler fails at any stage, the PEP denies access.

PostEnforce Lifecycle

@post_enforce inverts the order. Your view runs first, regardless of the authorization outcome. Only after it returns does the PEP build the authorization subscription (now including the return value) and consult the PDP.

This means the PDP can make decisions based on the actual data your view produced. For example, a policy might permit access to a record only if its classification level is below a threshold, something that can only be checked after loading the record.

If the decision is not PERMIT, the PEP discards the return value and calls abort(403).

If the decision is PERMIT, constraint handlers proceed through the same stages as @pre_enforce, minus the method-invocation handlers (since the view has already run). Return-value handlers can still transform the result before it reaches the caller.

Because the view runs before the PDP is consulted, if the view itself raises an exception, that exception propagates directly. The PDP is never called, because there is no return value to include in the subscription.

SAPL PEP libraries share a single unified enforcement model. It is a strict fail-closed state machine over the five decision verbs, where only PERMIT grants access and only an explicit SUSPEND pauses a stream without terminating it. See Authorization Decisions for the decision-verb semantics.

Constraint Handlers

When the PDP returns a decision with obligations or advice, the EnforcementPlanner resolves and schedules all matching handlers.

The ConstraintHandlerProvider Protocol

There is one extension point. A constraint handler is an object that implements the ConstraintHandlerProvider protocol, which has a single method.

from collections.abc import Sequence
from typing import Any, Protocol

from sapl_base.pep import ScopedHandler


class ConstraintHandlerProvider(Protocol):
    def get_handlers(self, constraint: Any) -> Sequence[ScopedHandler]:
        ...

The planner calls get_handlers for each constraint in a decision. The provider inspects the constraint and decides whether it can handle it. If it can, it returns one or more ScopedHandler entries. If it cannot, it returns an empty sequence and the planner asks the other providers. If no provider claims a constraint that arrived as an obligation, or if more than one provider claims the same constraint, the planner schedules a synthetic failure runner so the decision fails closed.

A ScopedHandler bundles three things.

Field	Description
signal	The SignalKind the handler attaches to. The decision signal runs once when the decision arrives. The output signal runs on the return value or on each streamed item.
priority	Lower runs earlier among handlers on the same signal.
shape	"runner" is () -> None, "consumer" is (value) -> None, "mapper" is (value) -> value.
handler	The callable itself.

The three shapes mirror the work a handler does. A runner is a side effect that needs no value, such as logging on a decision. A consumer is a side effect that has access to the value but does not change it, such as auditing the response. A mapper transforms the value flowing through a data-carrying signal, such as redacting fields. A mapper is admissible only for an obligation, never for advice. Advice is allowed to fail silently, and a value transformation that silently did not happen would leave the caller unable to tell whether the result was transformed.

Registering Custom Handlers

Register providers on the SaplFlask extension instance after calling SaplFlask(app) or sapl.init_app(app):

from collections.abc import Sequence
from typing import Any

from sapl_flask import SaplFlask
from sapl_base.pep import DECISION, ScopedHandler


class LogAccessProvider:
    def get_handlers(self, constraint: Any) -> Sequence[ScopedHandler]:
        if not (isinstance(constraint, dict) and constraint.get("type") == "logAccess"):
            return ()
        message = constraint.get("message", "Access logged")

        def run() -> None:
            print(f"[POLICY] {message}")

        return (ScopedHandler(signal=DECISION, priority=0, shape="runner", handler=run),)


sapl = SaplFlask(app)
sapl.register_provider(LogAccessProvider())

Registration rebuilds the planner. A single obligation can drive several handlers at different signals. The provider returns one ScopedHandler per handler, and the planner schedules each one against its own signal. The bundle is all-or-nothing during admissibility checks. If any handler in the returned sequence is not well-formed for the constraint’s tag, the entire claim is rejected and the decision fails closed.

Built-in Constraint Handlers

ContentFilteringProvider

Constraint type: filterJsonContent

Transforms response values by deleting, replacing, or blackening fields.

A policy can attach this obligation:

policy "permit-read-patient"
permit
  action == "readPatient";
  resource == "patient";
obligation
  {
    "type": "filterJsonContent",
    "actions": [
      { "type": "blacken", "path": "$.ssn", "discloseRight": 4 },
      { "type": "delete", "path": "$.internalNotes" },
      { "type": "replace", "path": "$.classification", "replacement": "REDACTED" }
    ]
  }

The blacken action supports these options:

Option	Type	Default	Description
path	string	(required)	Dot-notation path to a string field
replacement	string	"\u2588" (block character)	Character used for masking
discloseLeft	number	0	Characters to leave unmasked from the left
discloseRight	number	0	Characters to leave unmasked from the right
length	number	(masked section length)	Override the length of the masked section

ContentFilterPredicateProvider

Constraint type: jsonContentFilterPredicate

Filters array elements or nullifies single values that do not meet conditions.

{
  "type": "jsonContentFilterPredicate",
  "conditions": [
    { "path": "$.classification", "type": "!=", "value": "top-secret" }
  ]
}

ContentFilter Limitations

The built-in content filter supports simple dot-notation paths only ($.field.nested). Recursive descent ($..ssn), bracket notation ($['field']), array indexing ($.items[0]), wildcards ($.users[*].email), and filter expressions ($.books[?(@.price<10)]) are not supported.

Query Rewriting

Flask applications can filter results at the database through SAPL’s SQLAlchemy integration, the sapl-sqlalchemy package: a policy attaches a sql:queryRewriting obligation and the integration rewrites the query before it reaches the database, so unauthorised rows never leave it. Install it separately and register it once at startup.

pip install sapl-sqlalchemy

from sapl_sqlalchemy import SqlQueryRewritingProvider, register_orm_listener

register_orm_listener()
sapl.register_provider(SqlQueryRewritingProvider())

See Query Rewriting for the obligation format, the shared semantics, and what the integration does and does not cover (including the off-session fail-open caveat).

Streaming Authorization

For SSE endpoints, @stream_enforce provides continuous authorization where the PDP streams decisions over time. Access may flip between permitted, suspended, and denied based on time, location, or context changes.

Flask streaming responses use Response with mimetype="text/event-stream". The decorator bridges between Flask’s synchronous response model and the async PDP streaming protocol using a dedicated event loop, and renders each yielded item as an SSE frame.

A time-based policy that cycles between PERMIT and SUSPEND, so the stream pauses and resumes without terminating:

policy "streaming-heartbeat-time-based"
permit
  action == "stream:heartbeat";
  resource == "heartbeat";
  var second = time.secondOf(<time.now>);
  second >= 0 && second < 20 || second >= 40;
suspend
  action == "stream:heartbeat";
  resource == "heartbeat";

Connect with curl to observe streaming behavior:

curl -N http://localhost:3000/stream/heartbeat

Manual PDP Access

For cases where decorators are not suitable, access the PDP client directly via the extension:

import asyncio
from flask import jsonify, abort
from sapl_flask import get_sapl_extension
from sapl_base.types import AuthorizationSubscription, Decision


@app.route("/hello")
def get_hello():
    sapl = get_sapl_extension()
    subscription = AuthorizationSubscription(
        subject="anonymous",
        action="read",
        resource="hello",
    )
    decision = asyncio.run(sapl.pdp_client.decide_once(subscription))

    if decision.decision == Decision.PERMIT and not decision.obligations:
        return jsonify({"message": "hello"})
    abort(403, description="Access denied by policy")

When using the PDP client directly, you are responsible for checking the decision, enforcing obligations, and handling resource replacement. Flask views are synchronous, so wrap async PDP calls with asyncio.run().

Service Layer Enforcement

The same @pre_enforce and @post_enforce decorators work at any layer, not just on Flask views. When used on a service method outside of a Flask request context, the decorator automatically translates denial into abort(403) when a request context is available, or propagates the error normally otherwise:

from sapl_flask import pre_enforce, post_enforce


@pre_enforce(action="listPatients", resource="patients")
def list_patients() -> list[dict]:
    return [dict(p) for p in PATIENTS]


@post_enforce(
    action="getPatientDetail",
    resource=lambda ctx: {"type": "patientDetail", "data": ctx.return_value},
)
def get_patient_detail(patient_id: str) -> dict | None:
    return next((dict(p) for p in PATIENTS if p["id"] == patient_id), None)

The calling view does not need any special error handling. The decorator handles denial automatically:

from flask import jsonify
from services import patient_service


@app.route("/services/patients/<patient_id>")
def get_patient_detail(patient_id: str):
    result = patient_service.get_patient_detail(patient_id)
    return jsonify(result)

Service-layer decorators accept the same subscription field options (subject, action, resource, environment, secrets) as when used on views. When no Flask request context is available, subject defaults to "anonymous" and environment is empty.

Database Transactions

@pre_enforce and @post_enforce can own a transaction boundary, so a denial that lands after the view has written to the database rolls the write back. Three triggers cause a rollback: a @post_enforce DENY, a @post_enforce output-obligation failure, and a @pre_enforce output-obligation failure (the pre-decision permits, but its output obligations run after the view writes). A clean PERMIT commits.

This is opt-in. With no provider configured the PEP owns no transaction and enforcement behaves exactly as before. A provider is a zero-arg factory returning a context manager that commits on clean exit and rolls back on a propagated exception. set_transaction_provider is a method on the SaplFlask extension.

Flask views are synchronous and run on the blocking core, which uses the provider as a sync context manager, so pass the sync context-manager factory directly. A sync SQLAlchemy session.begin is exactly such a factory:

sapl = SaplFlask(app)
sapl.set_transaction_provider(lambda: get_current_session().begin())

The factory should resolve the current request’s session (for example a request-scoped session held in a contextvar). Django’s transaction.atomic is passed the same way:

from django.db import transaction

sapl.set_transaction_provider(transaction.atomic)

Client Resilience

The PDP client treats every transport problem as an operational condition, never as a policy outcome, and never lets one surface as an exception. A connection drop, timeout, or decode error fails closed to INDETERMINATE, which the PEP enforces as a denial, so a transient PDP outage can never accidentally grant access.

One-shot requests (decide_once) fail closed to INDETERMINATE immediately, with no retry, and never throw. In steady state the connection is warm, so only a cold or dropped connection fails closed.

Subscriptions (streaming decide) never terminate on a transport problem or on a server-side stream completion. Either condition emits one INDETERMINATE and then reconnects with bounded exponential backoff, indefinitely. Consecutive identical decisions are de-duplicated, so an outage yields a single INDETERMINATE, not a flood. A subscription ends only when the consumer cancels it or the client shuts down. This contract holds identically across the HTTP and RSocket transports and across every SAPL PEP client.

Demo Application

A complete working demo is available at sapl-python-demos/flask_demo. It includes:

• Manual PDP access (no decorators)
• @pre_enforce and @post_enforce with content filtering
• Service-layer enforcement using the same decorators on plain functions
• Custom constraint handler providers returning runner, consumer, and mapper handlers
• SSE streaming with @stream_enforce, covering terminate-on-deny, drop-while-suspended, and signalled suspend/resume
• JWT-based ABAC with secrets

Configuration Reference

All options are set via app.config:

Key	Type	Default	Description
SAPL_BASE_URL	str	"https://localhost:8443"	PDP server URL. Plain http:// is accepted only for loopback hosts
SAPL_TOKEN	str	None	Bearer token / API key for authentication
SAPL_USERNAME	str	None	Basic auth username (mutually exclusive with TOKEN)
SAPL_SECRET	str	None	Basic auth secret
SAPL_TIMEOUT	float	5.0	PDP request timeout in seconds

Streaming retry configuration is set at the sapl_base level via the PDP client options. The SaplFlask extension does not expose these through app.config.

Troubleshooting

Symptom	Likely Cause	Fix
All decisions are INDETERMINATE	PDP unreachable	Check SAPL_BASE_URL and that PDP is running
403 despite PERMIT decision	Unhandled obligation	Check the provider’s get_handlers() claims the obligation type
Handler not firing	Missing registration	Call sapl.register_provider() after init
Subject is "anonymous"	No user in g.user or flask-login	Set g.user in a before_request hook or use flask-login
Content filter throws	Unsupported path syntax	Only simple dot paths supported ($.field.nested)
RuntimeError: SAPL not initialized	Extension not registered	Call SaplFlask(app) or sapl.init_app(app)
Streaming response empty	Generator not yielding dicts	Ensure generator yields dicts (serialized as JSON SSE events)

License

Apache-2.0